CO129-580-2 Sino-Japanese War- British policy and reactions in Hong Kong and Malaya 27-7-1939 - 3-2-1940 — Page 105

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

165

FAR EASTERN (CHINA).

CONFIDENTIAL.

August 28, 1939.

SECTION 1.

[F 9600/87/10]

Copy No. 137

Viscount Halifax to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Shanghai).

(No. 842.) Sir,

Foreign Office, August 28, 1939. HIS Excellency the Chinese Ambassador called to-day on instructions from his Government to discuss the effect of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact on the Far-Eastern situation. Dr. Quo said that the information at the disposal of the Chinese Government indicated that the Japanese Government were much put out, and that the recent resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had been caused by the Japanese army attributing the present state of affairs to the failure of the Cabinet to sign a full treaty of alliance with Germany and Italy. In a European war Japan would probably at first wait and then, if the democracies seemed likely to gain the upper hand, make approaches to them. Indeed, there already seemed indications that the Japanese Government desired to renew friendship with the democracies. In these circumstances, he had been instructed by the Chinese Government to enquire whether, as a result of the Soviet-German Pact, there would be any change in the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Far-Eastern conflict.

2. I told Dr. Quo that, unlike Herr Hitler and Comrade Stalin, His Majesty's Government were not accustomed to change their policy overnight. That policy, which was well known to Dr. Quo, had last been set out in my state- ment in the House of Lords on the 3rd August last; briefly, it was that we hoped to try and improve relations with Japan without at the same time impairing our relations with China, or attempting to evade our treaty obligations. It was not, therefore, so much a question of what repercussions the pact would be likely to have on Great Britain's policy, but what effect it was likely to have upon Japanese policy. It might be that the Japanese would now be easier for us to handle, and they might be more disposed to be reasonable towards China. The shock to the Japanese had been great, since the Japanese regarded themselves as having been double-crossed by the Germans. But it was too early to say definitely whether there would be any radical change in Japanese policy. One would have expected that one result would be to make Japan more sensitive to United States opinion, a development which would be all to the good.

3. His Excellency agreed, but stated that, while Japan had been to some extent sensitive to United States opinion in the past, it had not affected their attitude towards China or their foreign interests, and, generally speaking, their policy towards the establishment of a new order in China would, he thought, remain unchanged. The composition of the new Cabinet would, however, give some indication of what methods Japan decided to pursue in China. Japanese army, he felt, would not lightly give up their programme of expansion in the Far East, since they were not yet convinced of the futility of their present policy.

The

4. Dr. Quo then referred to the decision of the Shanghai Maritime Customs to accept Hua Hsing notes from the 1st September in payment of customs duties. The Chinese Government recognised this as a serious development. I replied that I had no knowledge of this, and suggested that Dr. Quo should discuss it with the head of the competent Department.

5. In conclusion, Dr. Quo enquired whether there were any developments in the general European situation, and I informed him of the general terms of the reply which was being sent to Herr Hitler the same evening. There was perhaps just a ray of hope that a peaceful settlement might yet be reached.

I am,

&c.

HALIFAX.

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